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SMOKING OUT BIG TOBACCO: CAN THE FAMILY
SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT
EQUIP THE FDA TO REGULATE TOBACCO WITHOUT
INFRINGING ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
ABSTRACT
Tobacco use is one of the most catastrophic public health issues facing the
world today. The recently passed Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act (FSPTCA) gives the United States Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) unprecedented power to regulate tobacco products. While Congress
has explicitly maintained the legality of tobacco distribution in the United
States, the FDA’s newfound regulatory authority under the FSPTCA is a
necessary step to continue the fight against tobacco use. Among the most
significant provisions of the FSPTCA are restrictions aimed at tobacco
advertising and promotions.
These provisions, however, may
unconstitutionally infringe on First Amendment commercial speech under the
judicially crafted commercial speech doctrine governed by Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. Indeed, after the
FSPTCA’s passage, several tobacco companies filed suit, arguing that these
advertising restrictions violate the First Amendment.
This Comment examines the constitutionality of the FSPTCA by first
explaining the development of the commercial speech doctrine from Central
Hudson to Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Supreme Court’s most recent
application of the commercial speech doctrine. This Comment further explains
the wavering deference afforded the legislature under this doctrine, making
Central Hudson’s modern application uncertain. It then follows with an
analysis of the relevant FSPTCA provisions at issue, examines proposed
amendments to make the FSPTCA constitutional, and discusses implications
for the FDA’s jurisdiction over tobacco.
Ultimately, in light of the probable unconstitutionality of a portion of the
FSPTCA, this Comment argues that Congress must amend the provisions by
narrowly tailoring them to meet the government’s substantial interest in
preventing underage tobacco consumption. If these provisions are not
modified to fall within the constitutional confines of Central Hudson, the
FSPTCA will be nothing more than an impotent piece of legislation, leaving an
overworked FDA to pick up the pieces.
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INTRODUCTION: FIGHTING THE WAR AGAINST TEEN SMOKING
[T]he marketing of tobacco constitutes one of the greatest basic
industries of the United States with ramifying activities which directly
affect interstate and foreign commerce at every point, and stable
1
conditions therein are necessary to the general welfare.

After nearly fifty years of falling smoking rates, tobacco consumption in
the United States is increasing.2 Today, roughly 20% of adults in the United
States are smokers.3 Smoking kills more than 400,000 Americans a year4 and
more than five million people worldwide.5 Death is not the only social ill
caused by tobacco products; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
estimates that tobacco-related illness in the United States costs upward of $193
billion each year in health care expenditures and lost productivity.6 Equally
troublesome is the number of young people using tobacco products in the
United States. According to the Surgeon General, more than three million
American adolescents use smoking products, one million adolescent males use
smokeless tobacco products, and 82% of adults who have tried smoking first
smoked when they were under the age of eighteen.7 In contrast to the striking
toll on productivity and millions of deaths around the globe is the enormous
profit for the corporations that control the tobacco market.8 To protect this
1 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137 (2000) (quoting Agriculture
Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000), repealed by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-357, § 611(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1522) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Betsy McKay, Downward Trend in Smoking Rate Stalls, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2009, at A3
(discussing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 2008 national survey and reporting that
states who have used more aggressive regulatory schemes to curtail smoking have lower smoking rates and
that the CDC is hopeful that the FDA’s newly implemented regulatory scheme will have a more beneficial
impact on the continuing decline in smoking rates).
3 Id. (increasing from 19.8% in 2007 to 20.6% in 2008).
4 It has been well publicized that smoking has killed more than 400,000 people a year in the United
States since the late 1980s. See, e.g., Cigarette Smoking: Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life
Lost—United States, 1990, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 645, 645 (1993) (434,000 deaths
attributable to tobacco use in 1988); Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts (last updated Sept. 15, 2010)
(443,000 Americans die of tobacco-related causes each year).
5 See Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, supra note 4.
6 See id. ($97 billion in lost productivity and $96 billion in health care expenditures).
7 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (Aug. 28, 1996) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pts.
897, 1140) [hereinafter 1996 Final Rule] (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING
TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5, 65 (1994)).
8 Compare Duff Wilson, Philip Morris Meeting Mixes Tobacco Profit and Protests, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2009, at B5 (reporting profits of $16.3 billion on cigarettes sold outside the United States), with British Am.
Tobacco, Big Four Tobacco Profits Summary (Jan. 1, 1992), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
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market share and profitability, tobacco companies spend more than $6.1 billion
a year on advertising.9
While headlines in recent decades have publicized strong efforts by the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to curb tobacco use,10 the
government has not always been so assertive in addressing the public health
problems created by tobacco products.
In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).11 The FDCA defines the scope of FDA jurisdiction over drugs and
medical devices12 and requires the FDA to ensure that all drugs and devices are
safe and effective.13 Less than twenty years after the FDCA’s passage, the
Surgeon General declared that smoking causes lung cancer and other
diseases.14 In response, the House passed a bill amending the FDCA to include
FDA oversight of tobacco,15 but the bill never made it through the Senate.
Following that failure, Congress enacted numerous pieces of legislation
designed to regulate the tobacco industry. For instance, in 1965, Congress
enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA).16 Since
the FCLAA’s inception, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has exercised
regulatory authority over cigarette labels and imposed restrictions on claims,
while enforcing mandatory Surgeon General’s warnings on packaging.17 In

uai50a99/pdf (showing that the combined profits of the top four tobacco companies were over $16.8 billion in
1992, and Phillip Morris’s profits were over $10.9 billion in that same year).
9 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,475 (discussing 1993 Federal Trade Commission figures).
10 See, e.g., Winford R. McGowan III, Comment, Is It Time to Give Congressional Delegation a New
Filter?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 485, 497 (2002) (describing the media and social outcry against abusive tobacco
company practices and the subsequent regulatory scheme imposed by the FDA); Barnaby J. Feder, Tobacco
Curbs Face Legal Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1.8.
11 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006)).
12 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), (h).
13 See id. §§ 355(d), 360d(a)(2).
14 PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
29 (1964), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/M/Q/_/nnbbmq.pdf (finding smokers are 70%
more likely to die of heart disease, 500% more likely to die from chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and
1000% more likely to die of lung cancer).
15 H.R. 2248, 89th Cong. (1965).
16 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2006)).
17 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1). There are four warnings required on cigarette packaging, to be implemented
on a rotating basis: (1) “Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate
Pregnancy”; (2) “Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health”; (3) “Smoking By
Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight”; and (4) “Cigarette
Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.” Id. Similarly, there are three required warnings for smokeless tobacco
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1967 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) entered the tobacco
arena, promulgating regulations governing tobacco advertising on the radio
and television.18 In addition to the FTC and FCC, government agencies like
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), have authority to
regulate various aspects of the tobacco industry.19
In 1996, the FDA unsuccessfully attempted to regulate tobacco products
under the FDCA,20 which prohibits any misbranded food, drug, or device from
“introduction into interstate commerce.”21 The FDCA denotes a product as
misbranded “[i]f it is dangerous to health when used in the dosage or manner,
or with the frequency or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in
the labeling thereof.”22 However, to be regulated as a “drug,” the product must
be “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease.”23 After extensively investigating tobacco companies’ practices,
the FDA maintained that it had found the requisite intent needed to regulate
tobacco products.24 Without imposing an outright ban, the FDA sought to

packaging. Id. § 4402(a)(1). See generally Ronald M. Davis et al., The Rotation of Health Warnings in
Cigarette Advertisements: Compliance with the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, 9 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL’Y 403 (1988) (describing the increased efficacy of the mandated warning rotation system).
18 Jennifer Costello, Comment, The FDA’s Struggle to Regulate Tobacco, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 671, 677 &
n.32 (1997) (describing the FCC’s initial regulatory role, which required smoking cessation advertising in
conjunction with smoking advertising, and how successful lobbying by tobacco manufacturers led to a ban on
tobacco radio and television advertising altogether). Two years later Congress passed the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which banned tobacco advertising on the radio and television. Pub. L. No. 91222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2006)).
19 See Costello, supra note 18, at 678 n.42 (explaining the IRS’s role in taxing tobacco sales, the
Department of Agriculture’s regulation of tobacco farming, and the ATF’s job fighting illegal tobacco sales
and distribution).
20 See 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,615–18. These regulations are now the basis for certain
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA) provisions at issue. FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C.
§ 387a–1(a)(2) (Supp. III 2009).
21 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006).
22 Id. § 352(j).
23 Id. § 321(g)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also id. § 321(h)(3) (“intent” requirement for medical devices
that affect the structure or function of the body).
24 See id. § 321(h)(2)–(3) (defining a “device” as having an “intended” effect on the structure or function
of the body or an “intended” use in the cure or prevention of disease). This intent requirement has been a
difficult hurdle for the FDA in the past. See Costello, supra note 18, at 681–83 (discussing the FDA’s struggle
to establish jurisdiction through indirect evidence of intent); see also United States v. 354 Bulk
Cartons . . . Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959) (holding that cigarette labels
showed the manufacturer’s intent to affect the structure or function of a user’s body).
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classify cigarettes as restricted drug-delivery devices in an attempt to reduce
the exposure and influence of tobacco on the nation’s adolescents.25
Despite the FDA’s efforts, the Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. held that the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate
the tobacco industry.26 The Court concluded that under the FDCA, tobacco
would have to be banned altogether because it would be a “misbranded”
product that could not be approved as safe and effective.27 But due to
Congress’s repeated actions ensuring tobacco’s legality and prior FDA
acquiescence over tobacco regulation, the FDA had no jurisdiction to regulate,
or ban, tobacco products.28
Responding to mounting public pressure following the Brown &
Williamson decision, President Barack Obama signed the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA or Act) into law on June 22,
2009.29 The FSPTCA adopts the ill-fated 1996 FDA regulations and gives the
FDA exclusive jurisdiction to regulate tobacco,30 but specifically prohibits the
FDA from banning tobacco sales or eliminating nicotine from cigarettes.31
25 See generally 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,398 (“[T]he agency has concluded that, while taking
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco off the market could prevent some people from becoming addicted and
reduce death and disease for others, the record does not establish that such a ban is the appropriate public
health response under the act.”).
26 529 U.S. 120, 132–33, 137 (2000) (applying the two-prong statutory interpretation test set out by the
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see also
Costello, supra note 18, at 673–79 (describing Congress’s exclusion of the FDA in the development of tobacco
regulation).
27 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 135–37 (relying on 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), which prohibits introduction
of misbranded goods into interstate commerce). The Court found that if the FDA evaluated cigarettes as
devices, it would have to regulate them as Class III devices subject to premarket approval, and as a result,
tobacco products would not survive because of their danger. Id. at 136.
28 Id. at 137–39 (“Congress has directly addressed the problem of tobacco and health through legislation
on six occasions since 1965.”).
29 Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (amending FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006)); see also
Obama Signs Sweeping Anti-Smoking Bill, MSNBC.COM, June 22, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
31481823 (“The decades-long effort to protect our children from the harmful effects of smoking has finally
emerged victorious . . . .” (quoting President Barack Obama) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a) (Supp. III 2009); see also Regulating Tobacco: Q&A with Lawrence
Deyton, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2 (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/
ConsumerUpdates/UCM183967.pdf (discussing with the director at the Center for Tobacco Products the
FDA’s plan to regulate tobacco products in a way that protects the vulnerable youth population from undue
influence by tobacco advertising).
31 FSPTCA § 387g(d)(3) (noting the “importance of a decision of the Secretary to issue a regulation” yet
restricting the Secretary’s authority to reduce nicotine yields to zero or ban tobacco products). The FDA aims
to strike a balance between protecting the country’s youth from smoking and the rights of smokers to engage
in legal consumption of cigarettes. See Regulating Tobacco: Q&A with Lawrence Deyton, supra note 30, at 1;
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The Act also includes advertising and promotional restrictions,32 and places an
outright ban on the sale of flavored tobacco products.33
In light of the First Amendment attack on the advertising provisions of the
FSPTCA, Part I of this Comment analyzes the development of commercial
speech jurisprudence stemming from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission, which set the framework for the modern
commercial speech doctrine. Part II examines the constitutionality of select
provisions of the Act and proposed amendments that may bring the FSPTCA’s
advertising provisions within the province of the First Amendment. This Part
concludes by assessing the efficacy of the FSPTCA as it would stand without
its advertising restrictions—arguably the FSPTCA’s most significant
provisions. It then argues for Congress to amend the Act to accommodate the
First Amendment in order to give the FDA a fighting chance against the
tobacco industry. Part III reviews alternatives to the First Amendment position
adopted here, while posing questions for future thought in the realm of public
health regulation.
This Comment concludes by summarizing the
constitutionality of the FSPTCA and the direction the FDA should take to most
benefit public health and safety. Overall, this Comment takes a skeptical look
at the constitutionality of the FSPTCA in order to shed light on how this Act
can remain viable to further the country’s best interests in the area of public
health by successfully regulating tobacco products.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: BUILDING THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
FRAMEWORK
Among its provisions, the FSPTCA restricts tobacco advertising and
product distribution, adopting the FDA’s 1996 regulations.34 Because the
FSPTCA specifically gives the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products,

cf. James T. O’Reilly, FDA Regulation of Tobacco: Blessing or Curse for FDA Professionals?, 64 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 459, 459–61 (2009) (arguing that despite the positive headlines about the FDA’s newfound
regulation of tobacco, such regulation is really “the sticky remains of a messy bargain, negotiated in a
distracted Congress by expensive lawyers with clients who were potent contributors to political action
committees”).
32 For example, FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G) significantly restricts free sample distribution. See infra
Part II.C.5.
33 FSPTCA § 387g(a)(1) (including flavors like cinnamon, chocolate, vanilla, and cherry, yet specifically
excluding menthol from the ban).
34 Id. § 387a–1(a)(2).
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the fight now centers on the First Amendment constitutionality of the proposed
advertising and brand name distribution regulations.35
On August 31, 2009, several major cigarette manufacturers filed suit
against the United States and the FDA in Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v.
United States, alleging that the advertising restrictions embodied in the
FSPTCA unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment.36 These
provisions include: restricting advertising to black-and-white text; restricting
tobacco companies from advertising “light” cigarettes; prohibiting advertising
within 1,000 feet of areas where children congregate; banning event
sponsorship by tobacco companies; and prohibiting free sample distribution of
cigarettes.37 On January 5, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky issued a summary judgment ruling, partly in favor of the
tobacco companies and partly in favor of the government.38 Both sides plan to
appeal the decision.39
As a result of the pending appeal, an analysis of First Amendment
commercial speech jurisprudence is necessary to give an informed perspective
on the implications for the future of FDA tobacco regulation. Thirty years ago,
the Supreme Court set the standard for the regulation of commercial speech in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.40
Section A analyzes this seminal case and sets the framework for subsequent
commercial speech jurisprudence.
Section B discusses the emerging
35 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 34–42, Commonwealth Brands,
Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-CV-117-M), 2009 WL 2842131
[hereinafter Complaint]; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (holding that
the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products).
36 Complaint, supra note 35, at 34–42. Interestingly, Altria Group, Inc. (owner of Philip Morris USA,
Inc.) is the only major manufacturer openly supporting the Act. See Letter from Michael E. Szymanczyk,
Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Altria, to President Obama (June 12, 2009), available at
http://www.ussmokeless.com/en/cms/Responsibility/Legislative_Issues/pdfs/MES_Letter_
061209.pdf.aspx (explaining that Altria supports curbing youth smoking through H.R. 1256 but questioning
the First Amendment constitutionality of some of the Act’s provisions). Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs filed
suit in the Western District of Kentucky, an indisputably pro-tobacco state that relies on tobacco as its number
one cash crop with an average of more than $800 million in revenue from 1990 to 1996. WILL SNELL &
STEPHAN GOETZ, UNIV. OF KY. COLL. OF AGRIC., OVERVIEW OF KENTUCKY’S TOBACCO ECONOMY 1 (1997),
available at http://www.ca.uky.edu/agc/pubs/aec/aec83/aec83.pdf.
37 See Complaint, supra note 35, at 34–42.
38 Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
39 Duff Wilson, Judge Lifts Some Limits on Tobacco Advertising, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, at B3. The
FDA filed a notice of appeal on March 8, 2010. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND
FDA
STAFF
4
(2010),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM210766.pdf.
40 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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interpretation of Central Hudson and the varying standards of deference
afforded the government since the test’s adoption.
A. The Standard—Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission
After years of unclear commercial speech jurisprudence,41 the Supreme
Court established a four-part test to govern the constitutionality of commercial
speech regulations in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission:
For commercial speech to come within [First Amendment
protection], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
42
necessary to serve that interest.

This test established a guiding standard of broad application in the wake of
contrary precedent43 and unclear constitutional guidance with regard to
government regulation of commercial speech.44
In Central Hudson, the Court invalidated a New York regulation banning
all promotional advertising by electric utility companies.45 The New York
41 Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that the First Amendment protects
informational and political speech, not commercial advertising), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642
(1951) (finding a regulation prohibiting door-to-door solicitation constitutional despite the “fact that
periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment”), abrogated by Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
825–26 (1975) (deeming Virginia’s statute prohibiting circulation of publications encouraging abortion to be
an unconstitutional infringement of free speech even though the speech appeared in commercial form), and Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 (finding another Virginia statute unconstitutional where it restricted
pharmacists’ advertisements of prescription drug prices because a state may not “completely suppress the
dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients”).
42 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
43 Compare Breard, 341 U.S. at 642 (finding no First Amendment protection for door-to-door periodical
sales), with Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825–26 (including legal pharmaceutical price advertising in First Amendment
protection).
44 Compare Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (finding no constitutional protection for commercial speech), with
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825–26 (providing First Amendment constitutional protection for commercial advertising
of abortion).
45 447 U.S. at 557.
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Public Service Commission first prohibited promotional advertising in the
wake of a winter energy shortage.46 Three years later, however, the
Commission continued to implement the restriction after the energy shortage
had passed.47
Applying these facts to its new test, the Court dispatched the first two
prongs in short order: finding that the promotional advertising was lawful and
nonmisleading48 and that regulations promoting energy conservation
represented a substantial government interest in conserving energy and
maintaining equitable rates.49
Moving to the third prong, the Court accepted the government’s speculative
argument that because promotional advertising directly increased demand,
restricting such advertising would directly advance the government’s interest
in energy conservation.50
The Court asserted, however, that the Commission failed to establish the
fourth prong—that the means used to further its substantial interest were not
more extensive than necessary.51 Despite the government’s undoubtedly
important interest in conserving energy and maintaining equitable rates,
“suppressing information about electric devices or services” was unjustifiable
because the regulation reached all promotional advertising regardless of its
impact on energy use.52 Further, the Commission could not show that a more
limited restriction would not serve the state’s interests in energy
conservation.53

46

Id. at 558–59.
Id. at 559.
48 Id. at 566–68 (refuting the New York Court of Appeals’ argument that advertising by a monopoly can
not improve decision making by consumers and thus is not worthy of First Amendment protection).
49 Id. at 568–69 (upholding a complex economic argument advanced by the Commission, which argued
that promotional advertising would more likely lead to inequitable energy rates and distribution among
consumers). The Court utilizes a similar approach in most cases; the first two prongs are rarely at issue, while
the Court spends most of its time on the latter two prongs. See infra Part II.
50 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (“There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand
for electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would
increase its sales. Thus, we find a direct link between the state interest in conservation and the Commission’s
order.”).
51 Id. at 569–70.
52 Id. at 570.
53 Id. at 569–71 (considering that the Commission’s regulation also prevented Central Hudson from
advertising energy conservation).
47
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Central Hudson thereby established an intermediate scrutiny standard for
the protection of nonmisleading commercial speech, placing the burden of
proof on the government to substantiate its regulations on lawful commercial
speech.54
B. Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Following Central Hudson: Wavering
Judicial Scrutiny of Government Regulation
Despite the four clear prongs set forth in Central Hudson, the Supreme
Court has inconsistently interpreted the standard, leaving lower courts with
uncertainty and a flexible range of outcomes depending on the burden of proof
and deference afforded the government.55 This section first highlights the
wavering deference applied by the Court in the thirty years since the Central
Hudson decision. It then sets the stage for Part II by briefly explaining the
background to the most recent Supreme Court commercial speech decision—
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.56
Six years after Central Hudson, the Court in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico upheld a complete ban on casino
advertising to Puerto Rico’s residents through the Games of Chance Act,57
which sought to increase Puerto Rico’s tourism revenue, yet prohibited casinos
from advertising “or otherwise offer[ing] their facilities to the public of Puerto

54 Id. at 566–71; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing his argument in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), that commercial
speech should be given the same strict scrutiny protection given to noncommercial speech—similarly
supported by Justice Scalia’s aversion to Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny); Kerri L. Keller, Note,
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly: The Supreme Court Sends First Amendment Guarantees Up in Smoke by
Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REV. 133, 140–42,
172–79 (2002) (arguing content-based speech should be given strict scrutiny protection even if it is
“commercial” in nature).
55 Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 330–31 (1986) (declaring
restrictions on the local advertising of gambling to be constitutional while giving deference to legislatures to
establish regulations restricting speech), and United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993)
(upholding regulations restricting broadcasters from advertising lotteries while affording some deference to the
legislature), with City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412 (1993) (striking down a ban
on commercial publications distributed through freestanding news racks on public property because the
regulation barred an entire class of constitutionally protected speech), and Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 488–91 (1995) (finding the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s prohibition against displaying
alcohol-content percentages on alcohol-product labels failed both the third and fourth prongs of the Central
Hudson test because the regulatory scheme was irrational and failed to use less intrusive alternatives).
56 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
57 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 71 (1972).
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Rico.”58 For the first time, the Court deferred to the legislature, implementing
a standard akin to rational basis scrutiny and departing from the intermediate
scrutiny standard established in Central Hudson.59
Applying the first Central Hudson prong, the Court plainly found gambling
advertising lawful, giving it protection under the First Amendment.60
Conversely, Puerto Rico had a substantial interest in regulating advertising for
gambling—an activity that compromises “the health, safety and welfare of [its]
citizens.”61 The Court made an about-face, however, in applying the third
prong. Deferring to the legislature’s findings, the Court stated, “The Puerto
Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising
restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the
residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product
advertised. We think the legislature’s belief is a reasonable one . . . .”62
Deciding the fourth prong, the Court simply stated that “it is up to the
legislature to decide whether [less restrictive alternatives] would be as
effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on
advertising.”63
The Court in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.64 and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island65 rebuked the deferential standard applied in Posadas.66
Adopting similar interpretations of the Central Hudson test, the Court
vigorously reviewed the government’s evidence and tailoring under the third

58

478 U.S. at 330–32 (quoting P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (1972)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
See generally supra note 54 and accompanying text.
60 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340–41.
61 Id. at 341 (upholding the government’s argument that gambling by its residents, but not by tourists,
leads to an “increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the
infiltration of organized crime” (quoting Brief for Appellees at 37, Posadas, 478 U.S. 328 (No. 84-1903))
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
62 Id. at 341–42 (“There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity.
Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its
sales.” (quoting Cent. Hudson, Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
63 Id. at 344.
64 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
65 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
66 See id. at 510–14 (Stevens, J.) (following the reasoning in Coors and refuting two of the State’s core
arguments adopted from the Posadas opinion); Coors, 514 U.S. at 487 (reversing the deferential standard
espoused in Posadas and placing the burden on the government to show “that the challenged regulation
advances the Government’s interest ‘in a direct and material way’”). The conclusory rationale offered in
Posadas, that the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to
ban advertising of casino gambling, was also refuted in Coors. See id. at 482 n.2.
59
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and fourth prongs.67 The deferential standard espoused in Posadas has been
similarly disregarded and chastised by commentators.68
The strict analysis requiring strong government evidence and independent
judicial review adopted by the Court in Coors and 44 Liquormart may have
been relaxed in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly—the most recent Supreme
Court decision on commercial speech and most directly related to the current
tobacco litigation under the FSPTCA.69 In Lorillard, the Massachusetts
Attorney General, unhappy with the tobacco restrictions imposed in the Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA),70 expanded tobacco advertising regulation to
“close holes” in the settlement and “to stop Big Tobacco from recruiting new
customers among the children of Massachusetts.”71 The state regulations,
which covered cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars, prohibited outdoor
advertising within a 1,000-foot radius of a school or playground.72 The
regulations also required point-of-sale advertising to be placed five feet or
higher in retail operations open to minors and covered by the 1,000-foot rule.73
While the Court ultimately struck down these two advertising restrictions, the

67

See infra Part II.C.
Commentators have derided Posadas as a poor attempt to apply the Central Hudson test in any
meaningful way. See, e.g., Terrence Leahy, A Game of Chance: Commercial Speech After Posadas, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 1, 1988, at 58, 61 (“The concept that a right to restrict speech is merely a lesser included power of the
right to regulate conduct . . . is fundamentally at odds with many years of First Amendment jurisprudence.”);
Gary Weeks, Case Note, Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico: Promising
Precedent for Proponents of Tobacco Advertising Prohibition?, 40 ARK. L. REV. 877, 889 (1987) (arguing that
Central Hudson’s restrictions on government regulation of free speech were not applied in Posadas).
69 Lorillard, 533 U.S. 525, 557–59 (2001).
70 In 1998, forty-six states and the four largest U.S. tobacco companies entered into the Master
Settlement Agreement, restricting tobacco advertisement and promotion while paying the states $206 billion
over twenty-five years in exchange for dismissal of pending litigation against the tobacco companies. Master
Settlement Agreement (Nov. 25, 1998), available at http://www.ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdf/1msa.pdf. Under the
agreement, tobacco advertisements are banned on billboards, in sports stadiums, shopping malls, and on
promotional products like shirts and hats or in movies or television shows. Id. § III(c)–(f). Since the
advertising and promotional restrictions were self-imposed, the agreement does not infringe on the First
Amendment’s commercial speech protections. See generally Lori Ann Luka, Note, The Tobacco Industry and
the First Amendment: An Analysis of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 297 (1999–
2000) (arguing that tobacco companies that did not enter the MSA cannot be held to its terms without
infringing on their First Amendment commercial speech rights).
71 David S. Modzeleski, Note, Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly: Are We Protecting the Integrity of the First
Amendment and the Commercial Free Speech Doctrine at the Risk of Harming Our Youth?, 51 CATH. U. L.
REV. 987, 1004 (2002) (quoting Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 533) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the
MSA’s failure to protect youth from the hazards of smoking and Massachusetts’s subsequent attempt to further
restrict tobacco advertising).
72 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 21.04(5)(a) (LexisNexis 2000).
73 Id. § 21.04(5)(b).
68
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tight Court split and differing opinions about the proper constitutional analysis
pervaded the Court’s opinion.74
Whatever its past justifications, the judiciary is now faced with a
remarkable dilemma: protecting the country’s children from the single most
dangerous product in America or defending one of our most cherished
constitutional rights and the public’s right to be informed.75
II. A CENTRAL HUDSON ANALYSIS OF SELECTED FSPTCA PROVISIONS AND
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO BRING THOSE PROVISIONS WITHIN THE
PROVINCE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This Part analyzes the merits of the tobacco companies’ suit in
Commonwealth Brands as those facts apply to the four Central Hudson prongs.
Section A discusses the first prong and whether tobacco advertising is lawful
and nonmisleading—concluding that tobacco advertising should be subject to
First Amendment protection.
Section B follows, proposing that the
government has a substantial interest in reducing youth smoking under Central
Hudson’s second prong.

74 The Court rejected the tobacco companies’ argument that strict scrutiny should apply to content-based
regulations. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554. However, several Justices had certain qualms with the malleable
application of the Central Hudson test. Id. (pointing to past opinions where Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Ginsburg each doubted Central Hudson’s application in particular circumstances). These
questions about Central Hudson’s viability are not new—similar arguments were discussed in Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999) (noting scholars’, amici’s, and other
judges’ arguments to abandon Central Hudson’s test in favor of a more objective and less malleable test, but
ultimately concluding that Central Hudson “provides an adequate basis for decision”). See generally Michael
Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact
of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 267 (2003) (discussing the evolution of commercial speech
doctrine following Central Hudson and leading up to Lorillard). Supreme Court Justices are not alone in
questioning the suitability of tests like Central Hudson’s as an appropriate method for decision making. See
generally JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 52–53 (2003) (noting that the legal model of judicial decision making serves “only to rationalize
the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the Court’s decision-making process”).
75 The Court has often acknowledged the importance of the First Amendment in relation to the need for
regulations that benefit the public. Justice Stevens noted that other Justices

expressed “doubt whether suppression of information concerning the availability and price of a
legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to ‘dampen’ the demand for or use
of the product.” Indeed, Justice Blackmun believed that even “though ‘commercial’ speech is
involved, such a regulation strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.”
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 n.10 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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Considering the variety and number of restrictions in the Act, this
Comment analyzes a select group of problematic provisions.76 Section C
focuses on the third and fourth Central Hudson prongs. This section starts by
outlining the current standards for each of the prongs. The section follows
with an analysis of their application to the selected FSPTCA provisions, as
well as proposed amendments that would help the restrictions adhere to the
First Amendment standards espoused by Central Hudson.
A. Central Hudson’s First Prong: Nonmisleading Commercial Speech
The tobacco advertising subject to FDA regulation under the FSPTCA
easily meets Central Hudson’s first prong because it is nonmisleading and
lawful commercial speech, and thus entitled to First Amendment protection.77
Faced with a constitutional challenge to the FSPTCA, the FDA is
confronted with a challenge analogous to the one in Lorillard. With no
analysis, the Lorillard Court quickly stated that the first Central Hudson prong
was easily satisfied.78 Lorillard is not alone in broadly construing what speech
is nonmisleading. For example, in Pearson v. Shalala, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia held that unsubstantiated claims made on product
labels were lawful and nonmisleading and entitled to Central Hudson review.79
There, dietary-supplement manufacturers made health-related claims about
folic acid with no evidence to back their claims.80 Applying the first Central
Hudson prong in that context, the Pearson court differentiated “inherently
misleading” and “potentially misleading” claims, subjecting the latter to
Central Hudson analysis.81 Even though no evidence supported the claims, the
court found the labeling only potentially misleading.82
Despite the firm precedent establishing First Amendment protection,83 the
FDA argues that tobacco advertisements are misleading because they depict

76

See infra Part II.C.1–5.
See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554–55 (majority opinion).
78 Id. at 555.
79 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001).
80 Id. at 108–09.
81 Id. at 113.
82 Id. (ultimately failing the fourth prong because there were less restrictive alternatives).
83 Though not argued here, it is clear that the government’s long-argued “vice” rationale is no longer
viable. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513–14 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (rejecting
Posadas’s “vice” rationale); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1995) (refuting the
government’s argument that Posadas created an exception to the Central Hudson test because that reasoning
77
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young and healthy smokers in spite of extensive evidence linking tobacco use
to death and disease.84 This argument is misplaced because the advertisements
are not “inherently misleading.” First, tobacco companies are required to put
warning labels on all their packaging and advertisements.85 Second, though
advertisements may depict happy young people—like any product—the
advertisement merely tries to stress the product’s positive attributes.86
Persisting further, the FDA argues that such advertisements are illegal
because they are aimed at minors, whose purchase of tobacco products is an
illegal transaction.87 This argument, however, goes too far. If the Court were
to allow the government to engage in this slippery slope, regulators could ban
any advertising of activities that are not legal to certain segments of the
population; for instance, driving a car, purchasing a gun, voting, or drinking
alcohol.
The Court has always adopted a broad stance on what speech is protected
as nonmisleading under the First Amendment, and as held in Lorillard, tobacco
advertisements are no exception. Like other forms of advertising that
showcase a company’s product in a positive light, tobacco advertisements are
subject to the same First Amendment protection afforded all other commercial
speech. If the Court embraced the FDA’s narrow view, the government would
hold virtually unrestricted power in regulating undesirable speech it deems
misleading.88

was dicta, made after Central Hudson was applied). See generally Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (rejecting the
argument that strict scrutiny should be the appropriate standard for commercial speech).
84 See 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,471.
85 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the warning label restrictions implemented by
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006)).
86 But see Charles J. Harder, Comment, Is It Curtains for Joe Camel? A Critical Analysis of the 1995
FDA Proposed Rule to Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sales to Protect Children and
Adolescents, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 399, 417 (1995).
87 But see Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522 n.3 (W.D. Ky. 2010)
(rejecting the government’s argument that advertising reaching minors would be unlawful, failing the first
Central Hudson prong).
88 Cf. Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001) (referring to the settled principle that
“disclaimers are ‘constitutionally preferable to outright suppression’” in coming to the conclusion that
products that are only potentially misleading can be remedied with disclaimers rather than suppression of
advertising (quoting Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1999))); Richard A. Samp, Courts Are
Arriving at a Consensus on Food and Drug Administration Speech Regulation, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 313,
319–23 (2003) (describing the Court’s position on “inherently misleading” commercial speech and the
government’s ability to completely ban such speech).
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After the speech at issue passes the first prong, the burden shifts to the
government to prove the regulations further a substantial government interest,
directly advance the stated substantial interest, and are not more extensive than
necessary in furthering that interest.89
B. Central Hudson’s Second Prong: Substantial Government Interest
The FDA should have no difficulty satisfying the second prong, that
furtherance of the FSPTCA promotes a substantial government interest. The
Supreme Court decided a strikingly similar issue in Lorillard.90 The
Massachusetts Regulations there were based solely on the 1996 FDA
regulations that are the substance of the FSPTCA’s advertising restrictions
here.91 Swiftly analyzing the second prong, the Lorillard Court noted that no
party contested the State’s substantial interest in “preventing the use of tobacco
products by minors.”92
Moreover, the Lorillard Court is one among many to promptly accept the
government’s position on the second prong; several other cases similarly give a
remarkable amount of deference to the government’s decision to regulate in a
given area. For example, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act (FAAA) prohibited beer manufacturers from disclosing
alcohol content on their labels or advertising.93 The Court found a substantial
interest in preventing “strength wars,” a term used to describe the theory that
consumers may choose a beer solely based on its high potency, leading to
“greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs.”94
Relying on similar reasoning, the district court in Pearson accepted the
FDA’s argument that it had a substantial interest in protecting uninformed
consumers from unsubstantiated health claims.95 Ironically, it seems that the
court was willing to give broad First Amendment protection by finding the
89 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). The Court has
disavowed a possible “vice exception” to First Amendment commercial speech protection, an argument the
government has used in the past to shift the burden of proof. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
90 See Lorillard v. Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001).
91 Id. at 557.
92 Id. at 555.
93 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995) (citing FAAA, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201–211
(1982) (amended 1988)).
94 Id. at 485–86; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (Stevens J.)
(noting substantial government interest in temperance); 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,472–74
(articulating the FDA’s position regarding Central Hudson’s second prong).
95 Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001).
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claims nonmisleading, yet utilized the same unsubstantiated health-claims
argument to give merit to the FDA’s interest in protecting consumers from
misinformation.96
As described in the FSPTCA,97 Congress’s purpose in granting FDA
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco is to reduce youth tobacco use, making the
outcome of this prong relatively straightforward after Lorillard.98 Moreover,
the Act focuses on the ill effects of adult use, general tobacco dependence, and
full information regarding “modified risk” tobacco products.99 Applying the
uninformed-consumer-base problem in Pearson, these motivations give the
FDA’s argument further credence under the second prong. The substantial
interest in complete information is additionally persuasive when viewed in
light of the fact that the nation’s youth continue to become addicted to tobacco
even though the dangers of smoking have been known for more than forty
years.100 The government surely has a substantial interest in protecting the
public’s interest in making informed decisions.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lorillard firmly establishes the Court’s
trend in Central Hudson jurisprudence under the second prong.101 As a result,
the FDA’s substantial interests in preventing consumer misinformation and
reducing underage tobacco consumption should pass the second prong.

96 Compare to the district court’s treatment regarding the first Central Hudson prong, supra notes 79–80
and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
98 See FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111–31, §§ 2–3, 123 Stat. 1776, 1776–82 (2009) (describing congressional
findings and the purposes of the FSPTCA); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 7, at
230 (describing the effects of youth smoking on adult smoking and noting that “well over 80 percent of
adolescents who smoked half a pack a day or more as seniors in high school . . . were smoking five to six years
later as young adults”).
99 FSPTCA § 2 (describing Congress’s findings regarding the justifications for the FDA’s tobacco
regulation through the FSPTCA); see also id. § 2(37) (“The costs to society of the widespread use
of . . . modified risk products that do not in fact reduce risk or that increase risk include thousands of
unnecessary deaths and injuries and huge costs to our health care system.”).
100 But see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 7, at 135 (finding that “virtually all U.S.
adolescents—smokers and nonsmokers alike—are aware of the long-term health effects of smoking” but
choose to smoke anyway “because many adolescents feel inherently invulnerable”).
101 Potentially realizing this, the plaintiffs devoted one sentence to disputing this issue in their complaint,
but provided no support to their argument that the government lacks a substantial interest. Complaint, supra
note 35, at 30. The district court opinion thus did not address the second prong. See Commonwealth Brands,
Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
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C. Central Hudson’s Third and Fourth Prongs and an Analysis of Select
FSPTCA Provisions
The first two Central Hudson prongs generally apply to an entire piece of
legislation, rather than individual provisions, because the speech being
regulated and the substantial interest being served usually apply across the
entirety of a statute. The last two prongs are provision specific, however, and
this section will thus give a brief overview of the modern application standards
for the third and fourth prongs before offering a more detailed analysis of the
selected FSPTCA provisions and proposed amendments to each.
Most of the FSPTCA provisions at issue pass the third Central Hudson
prong because they directly advance the government’s substantial interest in
reducing underage smoking. For the government to prevail, it must show more
than mere “speculation or conjecture”102 by providing evidence that the
regulation will advance its substantial interest “to a material degree.”103 It is
thus imperative for the government to establish a link between tobacco
marketing and increased underage consumption104 because repeated judicial
opinions have refused to afford deference to the government’s “commonsense”
judgments.105
As supportive evidence, the 1996 regulations adopted by the FSPTCA
describe extensive studies showing the effect of advertising on youth
consumption of tobacco products.106 While this evidence correctly departs

102 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)).
103 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (quoting Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[A] commercial speech regulation ‘may
not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.’” (quoting
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980))); see also Lorillard, 533
U.S. at 557–61 (finding that the Massachusetts regulations adopting the evidence provided in the 1996 FDA
regulations were sufficient to fulfill the government’s burden under the third Central Hudson prong).
104 See Gerald W. Griffin, Note, Looking Past a Smoke Screen: A First Amendment Analysis of the Food
and Drug Administration’s Rule Restricting Tobacco Advertising, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 363, 371 (1997).
105 See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text. The FDA argued in favor of deference in its 1996
regulations, which are now adopted by the FSPTCA. See 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,474.
106 See 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,474–81 (noting studies establishing a correlative link between
anthropomorphic characters like “Joe Camel” and youth smoking, as well as R.J. Reynolds’s in-house study to
use similar characters to expand its young market (eighteen- to twenty-year-old smokers)). Even highly
suggestive Joe Camel advertisements are not without controversy concerning a causal connection to underage
consumption. See Griffin, supra note 104, at 371 (describing FDA studies admitting that no causal connection
between the advertising and underage consumption exists despite the clear intuition behind such an argument).
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from the government’s early reliance on common sense107 and tends to show
that the advertising restrictions directly advance the government’s interest in
reducing youth tobacco use,108 the government still must show that the
regulations as a whole are consistent and coherent with regard to the
government’s substantial interest.109
The biggest obstacle facing the FSPTCA’s advertising provisions is the
fourth Central Hudson prong, because the scope of the regulations is out of
proportion with the interest served in preventing underage tobacco use. The
fourth prong asks whether the FSPTCA provisions are more extensive than
necessary to further the goal of reducing underage tobacco use.110 This
requires a case-by-case inquiry and “a reasonable fit between the means and
ends of the regulatory scheme” imposed by the Act.111 The fit need not be
perfect, but the scope of the regulations must be “‘in proportion to the interest
served’; that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . [is]
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”112 The restrictions also
must be imposed through careful calculation of “the costs and benefits
associated with the burden on speech imposed by the regulations.”113
Applied in this context, the Court looks at the extent to which the
regulation infringes on the speech rights of both the regulated entities and the

107

The plaintiffs, and some commentators, disagree with Lorillard, arguing that the provided evidence
fails to establish a causal link to underage teen smoking. See Complaint, supra note 35, at 33 (arguing that the
Surgeon General’s reports show that almost all U.S. adolescents are aware of the dangers of smoking but
choose to smoke anyway because they feel inherently invulnerable); 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,487
(acknowledging claims that its cited report does not establish a causal relationship between advertising and
smoking, and addressing comments from trade associations and tobacco companies, which argue that
advertising does not have a material effect on youth decisions to smoke).
108 See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566–67 (striking the advertising restrictions under the third and fourth
prongs). The FDA, however, does not blindly rely on such studies to prove a causative link between
advertising and tobacco use. 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,476 (arguing the studies provide “useful
insight into how advertising affects smoking behavior and when considered with other studies provide
sufficient support for the agency’s conclusions”).
109 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (striking down a
regulation on private casino advertising that left Native American casinos unaffected, thus not directly
advancing the substantial interest in curbing the social ills attributed to gambling).
110 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
111 E.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561.
112 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting In re R.
M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)); id. at 479–80 (discussing cases in which the Court deferred to the
legislature’s reasonable judgment).
113 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417
(1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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public,114 and whether the government could employ less restrictive
alternatives that would further its substantial interest.115 The Court is
especially wary of absolute advertising bans that completely restrict consumers
from lawful product information.116
1. Black-and-White Text Requirement
The black-and-white text requirement, which prohibits tobacco advertising
or labeling unless the advertisement consists of only black text on a white
background, will likely be struck down under the Central Hudson test.
Though the provision appears to pass muster under Central Hudson’s third
prong, it is not narrowly tailored to further the government’s interest in
reducing underage tobacco use under the fourth prong. While the FSPTCA
provisions do not allow the FDA to lift the black-and-white requirement,117
there are a number of alternatives Congress can adopt to narrowly tailor the
provisions, such as expanding the range of publications excepted from the ban
and making a distinction between advertisements aimed at minors and those
directed specifically to adults.
Likely satisfying the third prong, the black-and-white restrictions directly
advance the government’s interest in reducing youth tobacco consumption
because color imagery is an important tool for advertisers, and without it,
tobacco advertisements may be less effective and have less influence on
adolescents.118 Often referred to as tombstone advertising, the FSPTCA
prohibits tobacco-product advertising or labeling unless the advertisement
consists of “only black text on a white background.”119 This restriction applies
to all advertisements except those in “an adult publication” or adult-only

114

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995).
116 See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561–63; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500
(1996) (Stevens, J.).
117 See FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a–1(a)(2) (Supp. III 2009) (adopting the 1996 final rule and precluding
any amendment to the 1996 final rule, except as expressly contemplated in the FSPTCA); Regulations
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and
Adolescents, 21 C.F.R. § 1140.32 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Final Rule].
118 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 523 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (finding
children highly influenced by color and imagery because they are unlikely to inquire further than an
advertisement’s images and are subject to more social pressure than adults).
119 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2) (adopting 21 C.F.R. § 897 (1997)); 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117,
§ 1140.32.
115
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facility.120 Adult publications are defined as having less than 15% youth
readership and less than two million total readers under age eighteen.121 Adultonly facilities can only use color advertisements that are attached to a fixture in
the facility and that cannot be seen from outside.122
The Lorillard opinion is instructive here because the Massachusetts statute
there adopted the same 1996 FDA regulations at issue in the FSPTCA.123 The
Lorillard Court departed significantly from the rigorous review applied by the
Court in Coors and 44 Liquormart, relaxing the extensive government
evidence required to satisfy the third prong.124 Though the studies cited in the
FDA regulations predominantly applied to cigarettes, the Court liberally
construed the evidence to apply to cigars and smokeless tobacco.125 The Court
also recognized an implied relationship between advertising and consumer
demand, concluding that “suppressed advertising may have the opposite
effect.”126
Recent Court decisions lend credence to the government’s argument that
restricting color and imagery from advertising will further its substantial
interest in reducing underage tobacco use. Without color and graphics,

120 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G) (amending 21 C.F.R. § 897.16(d) (1997)); 2010 Final Rule, supra note
117, § 1140.32(a)(2).
121 See sources cited supra note 120. Under this definition, magazines like Sports Illustrated, People, and
ESPN the Magazine would fail to qualify as adult publications because they have more than two million youth
readers, despite having less than 15% youth readership. See Complaint, supra note 35, at 13.
122 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2).
123 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557–58 (2001). The Court only applied the Central
Hudson test to cigars and smokeless tobacco because the Massachusetts regulations were preempted as they
applied to cigarettes. Id. at 541 (“No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
124 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505, 507 (1996) (Stevens, J.); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487–89 (1995).
125 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 558–59 (using the FDA’s findings that “considered several studies of tobacco
advertising and trends in the use of various tobacco products”).
126 Id. at 557. Despite the Court’s lenient standard, six Justices agreed that the regulation banning pointof-sale advertisements positioned less than five feet from the floor failed the third prong. Id. at 566–67.
Justice O’Connor dismissed the regulation’s logic because “[n]ot all children are less than 5 feet tall, and those
who are certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings,” showing that the regulations did
not logically advance the government’s interest. Id. (“Massachusetts may wish to target tobacco
advertisements and displays that entice children, much like floor-level candy displays in a convenience store,
but the blanket height restriction does not constitute a reasonable fit with that goal.”).
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advertisements will likely be less effective, especially to children, who are
arguably more susceptible to idealized imagery.127
Despite satisfying the third prong, the tombstone provision likely fails the
fourth prong because it is broader than necessary to further the government’s
substantial interest. The FDA achieves its goal of reducing underage smoking
only by “camouflaging tobacco advertisements in black-and-white text, in an
effort to delegitimize smoking” to all consumers.128 In support of its argument,
the FDA maintains that “consumers will lose little utility from these particular
advertising restrictions” because meaningful information is still allowed to be
distributed through nonmisleading printed words.129 The FDA further
contends that the restrictions will not impose significant burdens on the
distribution or receipt of information because it will coordinate with other
public health agencies to “disseminat[e] truly important consumer safety
information.”130
The FDA’s paternalistic arguments are misplaced given the Supreme
Court’s extension of First Amendment protection to color and imagery.131 And
while the tombstone requirement is not a complete ban,132 the very limited
adult publication and facility exceptions make it a short step to an allencompassing ban, thereby instigating closer review under Central Hudson.133
The Court has also repeatedly intimated that the government may not regulate
speech by arbitrarily choosing the speech it sees fit for public consumption.134

127 Tobacco trade associations argue this point in the fourth prong: color and imagery “are prerequisites
for disseminating relevant quality information,” without which “consumers could not be adequately informed
about the merits of new products.” 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,591.
128 Griffin, supra note 104, at 398.
129 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,591 (conceding that imagery may be important for tobacco sales).
130 Id.
131 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647–49 (1985) (finding that the government
may not forego the difficulty of distinguishing between advertisements aimed at the proposed substantial
interest simply because it is more convenient to implement a prophylactic rule).
132 The district court in Commonwealth Brands focused on this point, noting that the “‘blanket ban’ on all
uses of color and images in tobacco labels and advertising has a ‘uniformly broad sweep . . . [that]
demonstrates a lack of tailoring.’” Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 526
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001)).
133 See Complaint, supra note 35, at 13 (arguing that the adult magazines excepted from the regulation
would exclude major adult-focused publications, reducing the exception to a marginal audience); supra note
116 and accompanying text. The district court rejected this argument because the plaintiffs did not provide
evidence that an alternative definition of adult publication would be better tailored. Commonwealth Brands,
678 F. Supp. 2d at 525. The burden, however, is on the FDA to show less restrictive alternatives do not exist.
134 See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564 (noting that adult consumers have a right to receive information
about lawful products); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (indicating
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The FDA’s rationalization that it will decide what consumer information is
“truly important” is an insult to the First Amendment.
Congress can amend the black-and-white text provisions by expanding the
range of publications and facilities allowed to convey tobacco advertisements
containing color and imagery. As they stand now, the restrictions are broader
than necessary to limit underage tobacco use because an adult who does not
read qualified adult-only magazines or frequent bars and nightclubs will be
completely removed from colored advertising promoted by tobacco companies
and retailers. An integral first step is to increase or remove the two-millionyouth-subscriber element. Another plausible option would be expanding the
exceptions to include tobacco-only facilities or allowing retailers to implement
“adult-only” barriers like those required for smokeless-tobacco sample
distribution.135
Congress should also impose more probative requirements on the FDA,
thereby properly accounting for lawful consumers and their First Amendment
rights while still furthering the substantial interest of protecting the nation’s
youth from the risks of tobacco addiction and its attendant diseases. To do
this, Congress could require the FDA to distinguish advertisements that
influence minors from those directed solely toward the adult population on a
case-by-case basis.
For instance, the FDA could delineate between
advertisements showing young, attractive people in a fun atmosphere or
anthropomorphic characters like Joe Camel, and advertisements aimed toward
older segments of the population. While clearly a burdensome task, the
Supreme Court requires the government to expend the resources necessary to
protect the First Amendment.136 These further alterations would make the
restrictions more narrowly tailored to the substantial interest of reducing
underage tobacco use and less like a complete ban.
2. Restriction on Modified Risk Tobacco Product Advertising
The restrictions on modified risk tobacco products may fail both the third
and fourth Central Hudson prongs. A more coherent policy would place
modified risk tobacco products on at least a level playing field with traditional

that “a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying governmental policy” aimed at the
regulated activity).
135 See infra Part II.C.5 (describing the regulations for smokeless-tobacco sample distribution).
136 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646.
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cigarettes, giving more credence to the positive health implications of a
reduced-tobacco (or nicotine) product.137
The FSPTCA defines a modified risk tobacco product as “any tobacco
product that is sold or distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk of tobaccorelated disease associated with commercially marketed tobacco products.”138
Tobacco companies are prohibited from “us[ing] the descriptors ‘light,’ ‘mild,’
or ‘low,’”139 or directing statements to the public “that would be reasonably
expected to result in consumers believing that the tobacco product or its smoke
may present a lower risk of disease or is less harmful” than other tobacco
products.140 Manufacturers may only market modified risk tobacco products
with advance FDA approval, which is to be provided only if the Secretary
determines the product will “(A) significantly reduce harm and the risk of
tobacco-related disease to individual tobacco users; and (B) benefit the health
of the population as a whole taking into account both users of tobacco products
and persons who do not currently use tobacco products.”141
Viewed in light of the FSPTCA as a whole, the modified risk provision
may fail the third Central Hudson prong due to its inconsistent application.
The government persuasively argues that products making unsubstantiated
claims can create an insidious problem by persuading consumers to purchase
purportedly healthier products, which may actually be just as dangerous as
traditional cigarettes.142 Seen in this light, the FDA’s reasoning is similar to
that upheld in Pearson v. Shalala, where the court found that government
regulation of dietary supplements passed the third Central Hudson prong.143
Though it deemed that unsubstantiated claims made by supplement distributors
were nonmisleading, it held that this same lack of evidence merited the
government’s interest in protecting consumers under the second prong.144 In
this context, the government’s restriction on unsubstantiated health claims
137 See Joseph A. Page, Federal Regulation of Tobacco Products and Products That Treat Tobacco
Dependence: Are the Playing Fields Level?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 11, 41 (1998) (“It would not seem
reasonable to permit the playing field to tilt in favor of the more hazardous product. Indeed, the opposite
would be more consistent with sound public health policy.”).
138 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
139 Id. § 387k(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“or similar descriptors”).
140 Id. § 387k(b)(2)(A)(iii).
141 Id. § 387k(g)(1).
142 See FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(37), 123 Stat. 1776, 1780 (2009); supra note 99 and
accompanying text (describing the government’s interest in protecting consumers against tobacco products that
do not reduce risk as advertised).
143 See Pearson, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001).
144 See supra notes 79–82, 95, and accompanying text.
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directly advanced its substantial interest in protecting the veracity of consumer
information.145 An analogous argument can be made here. By eliminating
tobacco manufacturers’ ability to make claims about the reduced nicotine,
tobacco, or carcinogens in its products, consumers cannot make the
misinformed assumption that these products are safe or safer than other
tobacco products on the market.
Upon further review, however, this provision may be inconsistently
applied, as derided by the Supreme Court in Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States.146 The Court there struck down a federal
regulation banning broadcast advertising for casino gambling in New Orleans,
where such gambling was legal.147 Because the restriction applied to private
casino advertising, yet left Indian casinos unaffected, the provision was
inconsistently applied and did not directly advance the government’s
substantial interest in curbing the social ills created by gambling.148
The FSPTCA is similarly problematic because modified risk tobacco
products are strictly regulated, yet cigarettes making no health claims are
subject to less stringent FDA review if they qualify under the Act’s
“substantially equivalent” provision.149 To qualify for this special standard, a
predicate tobacco product must have been on the market on or before February
15, 2007,150 and the current product must have the same ingredient and design
characteristics as the predicate product.151 In this vein, the substantial
equivalence provision maintains the tobacco industry’s pre-FSPTCA status
quo while imposing stringent controls over premarket review for modified risk
tobacco products.152
These FSPTCA provisions are inconsistent and
inappropriate to fix the nation’s health problems created by tobacco

145

Pearson, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999).
147 Id. at 176–78. The Court pointed out that “[s]ome form of gambling is legal in nearly every state.” Id.
at 186 n.5. These legislative acts suggest that the government’s argument is not as strong when Congress has
made it clear that despite harm, some activities have countervailing economic benefits that outweigh their
attendant social costs. See id. at 186 & n.5.
148 Id. at 190 (“The operation of [the regulation] and its attendant regulatory regime is so pierced by
exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.”).
149 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a)(3) (Supp. III 2009).
150 Id. § 387j(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
151 Id. § 387j(a)(3)(A)(i), (B). If the product has different characteristics than the predicate product, it
may still pass the substantial equivalence standard if the Secretary determines that “it is not appropriate to
regulate the product . . . because the product does not raise different questions of public health.” Id.
§ 387j(a)(3)(A)(ii).
152 See id. § 387j(a)(2).
146
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consumption.153 This regulatory scheme creates “the absurd result that certain
tobacco products—like low tar cigarettes or electronic cigarettes—would be
exposed to the more onerous regulatory burdens . . . merely because they claim
to be healthier alternatives to traditional tobacco products.”154
The regulations at issue in Greater New Orleans, however, are
distinguishable. While those regulations were facially inconsistent by applying
to one subset of the population but not another, the inconsistencies in the
FSPTCA regulations implicated here are not as immediately apparent, and the
FDA can at least make the argument that it has tested predicate products,
making testing of their substantial equivalents unnecessary. Given this
distinction, the outcome under Central Hudson’s third prong could go either
way. Regardless, it is hard to ignore the fact that modified risk products are
more strictly regulated than traditional tobacco cigarettes, yet may be less
harmful.
Congress needs to abolish the substantial equivalence provision if it has
any intention of rectifying these contradictions. Though Congress could relax
the substantial equivalence application standards to include lower risk
products, most of these products are new to the market and thus unable to pass
such a review in any event. Further, the current problem lies with the
FSPTCA’s disincentive for tobacco companies to innovate and create healthier
products. In light of these perverse incentives, the better policy alternative
would be to remove the substantial equivalence provision and place all tobacco
products on a level playing field, starting with universal premarket review.155
Even if the modified risk provision passes the third Central Hudson prong,
it fails the fourth prong because it is more extensive than necessary to further
the substantial interest in reducing the health risk of tobacco users, let alone
underage consumption. At first glance, the provision seems narrowly tailored
by initially requiring tobacco companies to seek FDA approval before
marketing modified risk tobacco products and instigating case-by-case FDA

153 See O’Reilly, supra note 31, at 459 (arguing that the FSPTCA was negotiated between Congress and
tobacco companies that made large contributions to political action committees); Kevin Gauntt Barker,
Comment, Thank You for Regulating: Why Philip Morris’s Embrace of FDA Regulation Helps the Company
but Harms the Agency, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (2009) (arguing that an initially rejected version of the
FSPTCA, H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. (2007), is good for tobacco industry leaders like Philip Morris and bad for
the Food and Drug Administration’s pursuit of tobacco control).
154 Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. FDA, 680 F. Supp. 2d 62, 75 (D.D.C.) (enjoining FDA regulation of
electronic cigarettes under the FDCA), aff’d sub nom. Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
155 See Page, supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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evaluation.156 The provision nevertheless falls short by prohibiting the
Secretary from granting approval unless the product will “benefit the health of
the population as a whole.”157 This restriction requires the Secretary to take
into account nonusers of tobacco, making it virtually impossible for a tobacco
manufacturer to market a modified risk tobacco product that will benefit the
nonsmoking population unless the product does not emit secondhand smoke.158
Moreover, this restriction flatly prohibits tobacco companies from making
truthful and easily quantifiable statements about the ingredient content of their
products relative to other types and brands of tobacco products.159 It is
important to recall that “the Constitution is most skeptical of supposed state
interests that seek to keep the people in the dark for what the government
believes to be their own good.”160 The government clearly has a substantial
interest in protecting consumers from advertising practices that misinform them
of product attributes.161 But commercial speech related to nonmisleading
tobacco advertising remains protected by the First Amendment so long as
tobacco products remain lawful to adult consumers.162 The government thus
cannot make overly broad restrictions on the distribution of tobacco product
information.
To rectify the tailoring problems inherent in these provisions, Congress
must remove the requirement that a modified risk tobacco product be
beneficial to the nonusing public. To retain its significance, the regulation
should still require the product to reduce harm to tobacco users. This
requirement would also narrowly tailor the provision to the users at which the
substantial government interest is directed.

156

See FSPTCA § 387k(g)(1).
Id. § 387k(g)(1)(B); see also FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(37), 123 Stat. 1776, 1780 (2009).
158 This essentially limits possible product exceptions to smokeless tobacco products and electronic
cigarettes (tobacco-free cigarettes that vaporize nicotine for smokers to inhale), which the FDA has tried to ban
in separate litigation. See Smoking Everywhere, 680 F. Supp. 2d 62.
159 See FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 2009).
160 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). See
generally Howard K. Jeruchimowitz, Note, Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech Balancing: A
Potential Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 432
(1997) (arguing that advertisements lead to better informed consumers).
161 See Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2001).
162 The district court in Commonwealth Brands did not analyze this provision under a First Amendment
analysis because the FDA has up to 360 days to review a modified risk tobacco product before making a
decision, and the labeling restraint is not a restriction on free speech but on placing a product into interstate
commerce. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 533 (W.D. Ky. 2010)
(refraining from issuing an advisory opinion and thus waiting for the FDA to make a decision until after the
FDA’s 360-day time limit has elapsed).
157
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From a public health standpoint it is undeniably important to take issue
with the death and disease caused by secondhand smoke. But the government
cannot ban “light” or “reduced risk” tobacco smoke while allowing traditional
secondhand smoke to continue to harm the public.163 The modified risk
provision, coupled with the substantial equivalence exemption, ties the hands
of new product manufacturers by requiring them to meet “new product”
standards and prohibiting them from offering traditional tobacco users a
possibly healthier alternative.164 These requirements amount to a nearcomplete ban on speech related to reduced-risk products and must be revised to
pass constitutional muster.
3. The 1,000-Foot Outdoor Advertising Ban
As already dictated by the Supreme Court in Lorillard, the 1,000-foot
outdoor advertising ban violates Central Hudson’s fourth prong because it is
more extensive than necessary to further the government’s interest in
preventing underage tobacco consumption.165 Deciding the third prong in
favor of the state, the Court concluded that the outdoor advertising ban directly
advanced the government interest because the FDA regulations adopted by the
state provided ample evidence that tobacco advertising is linked to underage
tobacco consumption.166 Because this issue has largely been decided, this
subsection will hereinafter focus on the fourth prong.167

163 Though lacking evidentiary support, it seems intuitive that the large majority of tobacco products meet
the substantial equivalence standards while only those with possibly less harmful effects are subject to
nonusers benefit standards.
164 See O’Reilly, supra note 31, at 466 (“If a truly healthier cigarette were to be invented, the 2009 Act
erects substantial hurdles which disincentivizes the investment needed to reach the market.”). But cf. ELINOR
DEVLIN ET AL., LOW TAR PRODUCT CATEGORY 1, 3–4 (2003) (finding that even though “low tar” products
have been unanimously disproved as a “safer alternative” to traditional cigarettes, consumers continue to rely
on such products for a healthier alternative to traditional tobacco products). It is, however, important to note
that new products like electronic cigarettes still contain nicotine, technically a tobacco product, yet are free
from the harmful smoke and tar attributed to traditional cigarettes. See E-Cigarette Benefits, E-CIGARETTES
CHOICE, http://www.ecigaretteschoice.com/pages/Benefits.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). Yet, the FDA has
sought to ban them; under the FSPTCA, e-cigarettes are considered a modified risk tobacco product, making
their availability subject to FDA approval. See Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA and Public Health
Experts Warn About Electronic Cigarettes (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm173222.htm; see also Craig A. Conway, FDA Takes on Electronic
Cigarette Companies, HEALTH L. PERSP. (Aug. 2009), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2009/
(CC) ElecCig.pdf.
165 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001).
166 Id.; see also supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. It is also interesting to note that the Court
was closely split, 5–4, on the third Central Hudson prong. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561. While the Court
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To pass constitutional muster, the outdoor advertising restrictions must be
more specifically tailored to reducing underage tobacco use while providing
more adults with exposure to lawful outdoor advertising. The FSPTCA adopts
the 1996 federal regulations’ ban on outdoor tobacco advertising within 1,000
feet of defined places where children congregate168—the same one adopted by
the Massachusetts legislature169 and struck down in Lorillard.170 Because
Massachusetts adopted the FDA regulations wholesale, without adapting them
to the characteristics of the state, the restrictions were not narrowly tailored to
further the state’s substantial interest in reducing underage use.171 Similarly
troubling, the 1,000-foot restriction would result in an almost-complete ban on
outdoor advertising in metropolitan areas.172
In response to the analysis offered in Lorillard and the limited guidance set
forth in Commonwealth Brands,173 the FDA has placed the outdoor advertising
restriction on hold and is considering
“several options” for altering the 1996 outdoor advertising provision,
including limiting the prohibition . . . to only apply to billboards
within 1,000 feet of elementary or secondary schools, or prohibiting
signs or collections of advertisements greater than 14 square feet at

composition has changed since 2001 with the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, the Court’s political ideology is beyond the scope of this Comment.
167 The district court in Commonwealth Brands did not address this issue, however, because it found the
issue was not ripe because the Secretary had until March 22, 2010, to issue a final regulation. 678 F. Supp. 2d
at 536. Ripeness, however, is outside the scope of this Comment.
168 See FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a–1 (Supp. III 2009) (adopting 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,617,
§ 897.30(b) (defining restricted areas as “the perimeter of any public playground[,] . . . elementary school, or
secondary school”)).
169 See 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 21.04(5)(a) (2000).
170 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 565. The district court in Commonwealth Brands noted that because the “ban is
indistinguishable from the Massachusetts’ [sic] ban the Supreme Court struck down in Lorillard, Plaintiffs are
undoubtedly right [that the outdoor advertising ban is unconstitutional].” 678 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
171 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562–63 (“[A]lthough a State or locality may have common interests and
concerns about underage smoking and the effects of tobacco advertisements, the impact of a restriction on
speech will undoubtedly vary from place to place.”).
172 Id. at 562. It is also important to note that the advertising ban is not limited to outdoor advertising
such as billboards. As noted in Commonwealth Brands’ complaint, retailers use tobacco advertising on their
storefronts to entice customers into their store and hopefully to “trigger spontaneous purchase decisions of
non-tobacco products.” Complaint, supra note 35, at 24. This is an important distinction, highlighting the fact
that retailers advertise price and product with no intent to influence adolescents into making tobacco purchase
decisions.
173 See supra note 167 (noting the issue is not ripe because under this provision the Secretary has yet to
issue a final rule comporting with the First Amendment).
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retail establishments located in close proximity to any elementary or
174
secondary school.

As noted in Lorillard, the 1,000-foot restrictions will have very different
effects depending on “whether a locale is rural, suburban, or urban.”175 An
adult consumer seeking to receive truthful tobacco information would be hardpressed to find tobacco billboards in a city, while a similarly situated consumer
in a rural area would find such information easily available. Placing the
burden on the FDA to apply a more subjective rule depending on population
density would reconcile the disparity in teenagers’ abilities to view such
advertising176 and assuage the restriction on adult consumers.
The regulations should also aim to differentiate between manufacturer
advertising targeted at influencing new product purchase decisions and
advertising by retailers that highlights products within the store.177 Given that
the FDA has failed to establish a link between retailer advertising and
underage tobacco consumption, it is necessary to amend the current provisions
to allow merchants to price-advertise. Without such changes, it may not be
possible to make a meaningful distinction between the FSPTCA and the
Massachusetts regulations that failed the fourth Central Hudson prong in
Lorillard.178
4. Ban on Event Sponsorship and Promotional Products
Though the promotional ban will likely pass muster under the third Central
Hudson prong, it is probably more extensive than necessary to achieve the
ascertained goal of reducing underage tobacco use. To meet the requirements
of the fourth prong, Congress should implement less restrictive alternatives
like expanding the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act’s warning
requirements to include merchandise, strictly enforcing merchandise purchase
age requirements, and distinguishing between adult-only events and those
likely to attract underage audiences.
174 C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41304, FDA FINAL RULE
RESTRICTING THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIGARETTES AND SMOKELESS TOBACCO 14 (2010) (quoting
Request for Comment on Implementation of the FSPTCA, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,241, 13,242 (proposed Mar. 19,
2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
175 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 563.
176 Consider a person’s ability to view a billboard 1,000 feet away in a city surrounded by tall buildings
and where a minor might not travel more than a few blocks in a given day. Compare this with a rural teenager
who travels a greater distance to schools and has a more unobstructed view of outdoor advertising.
177 See supra note 172.
178 See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562–63.
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Under the Secretary’s final rule, tobacco manufacturers may not
“sponsor . . . any athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or cultural event, or
any entry or team in any event . . . [with any] indicia of product
identification . . . identifiable with[] those used for any brand of cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco.”179 The rule also prohibits distribution or marketing of any
promotional item with a tobacco product’s “logo, symbol, motto, selling
message,” or pattern.180
These provisions essentially ban tobacco
manufacturers from marketing their brand name outside of magazines.181
The promotional ban appears to directly advance the government’s
substantial interest of reducing youth tobacco use because the underage
population readily consumes tobacco merchandise and event sponsorship.182 It
is conceivable that minors may even increase their tobacco consumption to
fulfill the purchase requirements necessary to obtain these promotional
products. Also, products like lighters and matches are directly attributable to
tobacco use and establish a clear connection between distribution and
consumption.183 Adding to the government’s argument, tobacco merchandise
and sponsorship advertising do not contain the health warnings otherwise
required on packaging and product advertising, making the risks of tobacco use
less recognizable.184 Considering the extent of event sponsorship through the
wide reach of television and other media outlets, a restriction on tobacco
promotion will undoubtedly lead to reduced youth tobacco use.
Even though the required connection is likely made under the third prong,
these restrictions may be more extensive than necessary because they
unnecessarily restrict not only youth advertising and merchandise
consumption, but lawful adult distribution as well. While some underage
consumers may get their hands on promotional products, these merchandise
179

2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.34(c); see also FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a–1(a) (Supp. III

2009).
180

2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.34(a).
Id. There are no exceptions to these restrictions.
182 Merchandise distribution, however, is directly aimed at adults and often requires proof of purchase or
UPC labels. Compare Age Filtering Software, CAMEL.COM, https://camel.tobaccopleasure.com/modules/
FooterLinks/AgeFiltering.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (encouraging age filtering software and also
screening new users’ ages, including a forty-eight-hour waiting period to use the site), with Kurt M. Ribisl et
al., A Content Analysis of Web Sites Promoting Smoking Culture and Lifestyle, 30 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV.
64 (2003) (finding most web sites that promote smoking culture do not require age verification).
183 See Edward Sepe et al., Smooth Moves: Bar & Nightclub Tobacco Promotions That Target Young
Adults, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 414, 415 (2002).
184 See Scott Sullivan, Note, Tobacco Talk: Why FDA Tobacco Advertising Restrictions Violate the First
Amendment, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 743, 782 (1997).
181
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programs are directed at adults, where the vast majority of use lies. These
programs also require age verification to obtain promotional products.185
While event sponsorship is generally aimed at all viewers, not just adults, the
FSPTCA institutes a complete ban on sponsorship without considering less
restrictive alternatives for adult-specific events.186
In its summary judgment opinion, the district court in Commonwealth
Brands, however, found the merchandising provisions sufficiently tailored,
passing the fourth prong.187 The court relied on Congress’s finding that
“[t]here is no way to limit the distribution of these items to adults only” and
that the MSA was an ineffective solution to the problem.188 Agreeing with the
FDA, the court deemed that even if such merchandise were not distributed to
children, adult wearers would become “walking advertisements” and would be
“very effective in creating the sense that tobacco use is widely accepted.”189
Concluding its analysis, the court surmised that even though some advertising
is for adult-only events, the advertising itself is distributed to the public and
available to minors.190
The district court’s analysis is comprehensive but unconvincing. First, the
court unduly deferred to Congress’s findings despite the Supreme Court’s
explicit assertions in Coors and 44 Liquormart repudiating overt legislative
Further, the MSA’s ineffectiveness is not an adequate
deference.191
justification for adopting overbroad restrictions. Second, the court’s reasoning
that adults become walking tobacco advertisements perpetuating tobacco’s
societal acceptance discounts the fact that smoking is accepted by Congress
itself. Several provisions within the FSPTCA highlight this discontinuity. For
instance, the modified risk products provision maintains the status quo for
major tobacco manufacturers,192 and the FSPTCA’s limited confidentiality
185

Cf. supra note 182.
For example, Lorillard sponsors a gambling tournament in Las Vegas; participants must be over
twenty-one, and minors are not allowed on the premises. See Complaint, supra note 35, at 25.
187 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 527–28 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
188 Id. at 527 (alteration in original) (quoting 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,526); id. at 524–26
(refuting the plaintiff’s argument that the Act does not differentiate between adults and children). The court
cited two journal articles and a district court case that found tobacco companies increased their sponsorship
budgets after signing the MSA. Id. at 526–28. Not only is this “proof” unconvincing, the argument that
Congress found the MSA insufficient is not a relevant justification for implementing an overbroad restriction
on commercial speech.
189 Id. at 527–28 (quoting 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,526).
190 Id. at 527 n.4.
191 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
192 See supra Part II.B.2.
186
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provision193—lauded for providing much needed transparency—is more
protective of the tobacco industry than it is restrictive. So long as such
provisions continue to contradict the purpose of the FSPTCA, it remains
difficult to make a compelling argument that advertising of lawful products
explains children’s conception that tobacco use is widely accepted. Third, the
court’s argument that sponsorship of adult-only events is still available to
minors belies the problem with these provisions. For instance, casinos that
advertise an adult-only event sponsored by a tobacco company are unlikely to
direct their advertisements to children, and any advertising distributed solely
“in-house” would be completely unavailable to minors. In contrast, the
assertion that most large sporting and musical events are widely available to
the youth population is undoubtedly correct. But commercial speech
jurisprudence is also clear in requiring the government to undertake the
difficulty of distinguishing between advertisements aimed at the proposed
substantial interest and those otherwise caught within a broad prophylactic rule
that infringes on the public’s First Amendment rights.194
With regard to merchandise distribution, the FSPTCA could implement
less restrictive alternatives like utilizing stricter age laws and extending the
FCLAA’s warning requirements195 to include tobacco merchandise. Though
difficult to employ less restrictive alternatives for sponsorship because of the
wide viewership of athletic events and concerts, Congress could narrowly
tailor the restrictions to create exceptions for adult-only advertising venues like
gambling or fighting events. While such exceptions may be difficult to
administer, it is up to Congress and the FDA to make such distinctions in order
to uphold the First Amendment rights of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and
lawful consumers.
5. Prohibition on Free Sample Product Distribution
The restrictions on free sample distribution may not pass the third Central
Hudson prong because they are applied inconsistently between cigarettes and

193 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387f(c) (Supp. III 2009). Despite this provision, tobacco companies are actually
protected by the Freedom of Information Act, prescribing that manufacturers’ product information “shall not
be disclosed” if their commercial interests are affected. See O’Reilly, supra note 31, at 461–62 & n.18
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 387f(c)) (arguing that the language in § 387f(c) “is an effort to trigger blanket secrecy
under [Freedom of Information Act] exemption 3”). For example, this issue would be implicated under the
product testing provision of the FSPTCA. FSPTCA § 387o(b)(1).
194 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
195 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).
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smokeless tobacco products. Similarly problematic under the fourth prong,
these provisions give no justification for banning cigarette samples, yet provide
a narrowly tailored alternative for smokeless tobacco products. A simple
solution to both problems is to bring cigarettes within the province of the
exception provided for smokeless tobacco products.
Section 387a–1(a)(2)(G) prohibits free sample distribution of “cigarettes,
smokeless tobacco, or other tobacco products,” with certain limited
exceptions.196 Free sample distribution is only permitted for smokeless
tobacco products in a “qualified adult-only facility.”197 To qualify as an adultonly facility, a retailer cannot sell alcohol or be located across from a space
used for youth activities, must contain an enclosed barrier for free sample
distribution out of public view, and have a security guard to check the
authenticity of consumers’ age identification.198
The FDA has not provided a coherent justification for allowing a smokeless
product exception under § 387a–1(a)(2)(G), yet placing an outright ban on
cigarette and other smoking tobacco sample distribution. One could imagine
the argument that cigarettes are more dangerous to the public than smokeless
tobacco products, which do not produce secondhand smoke and are only
dangerous to the user. The substantial government interest offered by the
government, however, works to curb youth consumption. Aiming to protect
the public from secondhand smoke is a much broader interest and at odds with
the rest of the Act, which allows for continued distribution of traditional
smoking products. For example, a strikingly disingenuous provision allows for
distribution and continued use of menthol cigarettes while banning cloves and
flavored cigarettes.199 Though only 2%–3% of teenagers use flavored
cigarettes and cloves,200 25%–30% of the cigarettes sold in the United States

196

FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G); 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.16(d)(1).
FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G); 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.16(d)(2). The Commonwealth
Brands court held that free samples do not fall within the realm of First Amendment protection because they
entail “the distribution of a product, not speech—and, even if thought of as a speech restriction, it would seem
fully permissible as a restriction on price.” Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512,
538 (W.D. Ky. 2010). Congress, however, did not restrain the distribution of tobacco products, as it is still
lawful to sell and distribute them. It is not clear that Congress sought to create a price restriction on free
tobacco.
198 FSPTCA § 387a–1(a)(2)(G); 2010 Final Rule, supra note 117, § 1140.16(d)(2).
199 FSPTCA § 387g(a)(1)(A).
200 See Teen Smoking Statistics, TEEN SMOKING, http://www.teensmoking.us/content/teen-smokingstatistics.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
197
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are of a menthol variety.201 If the substantial interest sought by the FSPTCA
were to protect the general public health, it is inconceivable that tobacco
product distribution would still be a lawful activity.202 Though the advertising
restrictions in Greater New Orleans more flagrantly disregarded the substantial
government interest at hand,203 the arbitrary distinction between free samples
of smokeless tobacco and cigarettes is problematic because it creates an
incoherent gap between the product classes and thus calls into question
§ 387a–1(a)(2)(G)’s viability under the third prong.
The complete ban on tobacco sample distribution, save smokeless tobacco,
is also more extensive than necessary to accomplish the government’s interest
in reducing teen smoking. In addition to the Court’s misgivings concerning
complete bans,204 the disconnect between smoking and smokeless tobacco
products underscores the problem with this provision.205
Completely
restricting one class of products is clearly more rigorous than the qualified
adult-only facilities exception created for smokeless tobacco products. This
juxtaposition begs the question: Are the requirements for smokeless-tobacco
sample distributions not rigorous enough or are the regulations on all other
tobacco products more extensive than necessary?
A possible answer to this question may be drawn through analogy. It has
been shown that raising cigarette taxes will inhibit youth smoking by making it
cost prohibitive.206 Free sample distribution to underage smokers could
circumvent teenagers’ inability to fund their smoking habits. Preventing free

201 See Daniel R. Brooks et al., Menthol Cigarettes and Risk of Lung Cancer, 158 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
609, 609–10 (2003).
202 See generally FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 138–39 (2000) (finding
Congress’s repeated legislation enabling continued distribution of tobacco products precluded the FDA from
regulating tobacco products).
203 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (finding that the statute
aimed to protect the public from the social ills of gambling, yet failed to regulate Native American casinos);
see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488–89 (1995) (finding that the statute failed the third
Central Hudson prong due to incoherent and contradictory regulatory provisions).
204 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561–63 (2001); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J.).
205 Compare FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387a–1(a)(2)(G) (Supp. III 2009) (amending 21 C.F.R.
§ 897.16(d)(2)(A)–(B) (1997)), with id. (amending 21 C.F.R. § 897.16(d)(2)(C) (1997)).
206 See Sherry Emery et al., Does Cigarette Price Influence Adolescent Experimentation?, 20 J. HEALTH
ECON. 261, 268–69 (2001) (finding that excise taxes are only a deterrent to advanced teen smokers, not lightly
using experimenters). For an economist’s viewpoint, see Steven M. Suranovic, An Economic Model of Youth
Smoking: Welfare and Tax Effects 27 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://129.3.20.41/
eps/hew/papers/0511/0511003.pdf (“[T]he results show that much higher cigarette taxes . . . could reduce or
eliminate teen smoking but the levels of taxes may need to be quite high.”).
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sample distribution to underage consumers clearly extends from such an
intuitive argument. It is less certain, however, that underage consumers in
search of cheap cigarettes would roam different locations in search of free
samples. It is even less clear that minors would skirt the qualified adult-only
facilities provision by producing false identification to a police officer or
security guard.207 Moreover, policy initiatives that include retailers in the fight
against underage consumption and point-of-sale purchase have been successful
where efforts to educate and promote legal tobacco distribution are long-term,
community wide, and coupled with strict enforcement.208 The qualified adultonly facility exception not only requires police officers to verify age
identification, but also involves retailers by restricting where and how sample
distribution displays must be erected. It thus provides at least an initial step
toward the retailer involvement that is necessary for a successful campaign
against illegal tobacco sales.
Without further justification, a blanket restriction on free sample
distribution of cigarettes is more extensive than necessary to reduce teen
smoking, and a qualified adult-only exception may be more properly tailored
to the substantial interest at hand. The safest amendment to § 387a–1(a)(2)
would be to treat all smoking and smokeless tobacco products the same, curing
the incoherent distinction between the two. Adapting the current qualified
adult-only facility exception to include smoking products also lifts the
complete ban on free sample distribution and rectifies the provision’s current
failure to comply with the fourth Central Hudson prong.
6. Consequences of Unconstitutional Advertising Restrictions and the
Remnants of the FSPTCA
If the FSPTCA’s advertising restrictions unconstitutionally violate the First
Amendment, then the rest of the Act will lose the ability to fulfill its stated
purpose of reducing underage smoking—and ultimately the FDA’s capacity to
improve public health.209 The FSPTCA’s most pertinent remaining provisions
207 Compare Emery et al., supra note 206 (finding new smokers get cigarettes from friends, ask others to
buy cigarettes for them, or both), with U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 7, at 10 (“Illegal
sales of tobacco products are common. Active enforcement of age-at-sale policies by public officials and
community members appears necessary to prevent minors’ access to tobacco.”).
208 See Jean L. Forster & Mark Wolfson, Youth Access to Tobacco: Policies and Politics, 19 ANN. REV.
PUB. HEALTH 203, 225–27 (1998); Jeruchimowitz, supra note 160, at 439–40 (arguing for stricter enforcement
of age restrictions and retailer enforcement laws).
209 See FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3, 123 Stat. 1776, 1781–82 (2009); see also 2010 Final Rule,
supra note 117, § 1140.2.
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would be the restrictions on new tobacco products,210 the prohibition on
flavored tobacco products,211 inspection of tobacco manufacturer facilities,212
and limited confidentiality of product ingredients.213 These provisions are
universally impotent and contain considerable exceptions, notably consistent in
maintaining the tobacco industry’s status quo.214 Considering the FDA’s
substantial limitations on regulating existing tobacco products, losing the
advertising provisions would be a catastrophic blow to the efficacy of the
FSPTCA. As evidence of such, the FDA is restricted from recalling cigarettes
from the market,215 increasing the age limitation on tobacco purchase,216 or
banning tobacco products entirely.217 The FDA is thus hobbled by the inability
to truly reduce the harmful effects of tobacco products by directly restraining
their supply.
Tobacco use still contributes to at least 400,000 deaths in the United States
each year.218 To combat this public health crisis without banning tobacco
distribution entirely, the FDA must direct its efforts at consumer demand by
regulating tobacco advertising that has ostensibly targeted the youth population
for years.219 It is thus imperative that Congress amend the advertising
provisions to comply with the First Amendment through Central Hudson.
Several of the amendments proposed earlier in this Part argue for more
narrowly tailored provisions that emphasize a regulatory scheme specifically
aimed at combating underage tobacco consumption. While such distinctions
are difficult to make, a prophylactic rule banning all such communication
creates an unwarranted and overly broad restriction on lawful communication
between tobacco companies and consumers.220 This lawful communication is
210

FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
Id. § 387g(a)(1).
212 Id. § 387e(g).
213 Id. § 387f(c).
214 See supra Part II.C.1–5.
215 FSPTCA § 387h(c) (requiring a “reasonable probability that a tobacco product contains a
manufacturing or other defect not ordinarily contained in tobacco products on the market,” meaning tar,
nicotine, carcinogens, and the risk of death and disease are not adequate reasons to recall a tobacco product).
216 Id. § 387f(d)(3)(A)(ii).
217 Id. § 387g(d)(3) (stating that “[b]ecause of the importance of a decision of the Secretary to issue a
regulation” the FDA may not ban cigarettes or smokeless tobacco from the market nor reduce their nicotine
content to zero).
218 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
219 See FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(15)–(21), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777–78 (2009). It is similarly
questionable that the world’s largest purveyor of tobacco products, Philip Morris, is absent from this litigation
and supported the FSPTCA’s adoption. See Letter, supra note 36 (showing Altria’s support of the FSPTCA).
220 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985).
211
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so valuable to the public welfare that regulators must bear the burden of
“distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and
the harmless from the harmful.”221 For the FDA to withstand the First
Amendment challenges made in Commonwealth Brands, it must be prepared to
take on the advertising issue in a case-by-case manner, abandoning the
inhibitory measures that call the FSPTCA’s constitutionality into question.
In addition to the specific proposals made earlier, there are several
alternatives passed on by the FSPTCA that aim at the heart of reducing
underage tobacco consumption and apply to all the Act’s restrictions, such as:
implementing smoking cessation and tobacco education programs for children;
increasing tobacco excise taxes; prosecuting underage use, possession, and sale
to minors; and government-sponsored public service announcements aimed at
reducing smoking.222 All of these alternatives have proven somewhat
successful in reducing smoking.223 For example, government-sponsored
advertisements aimed at informing the public of tobacco’s harmful effects
were so successful in the 1960s that the tobacco industry agreed to take
tobacco advertisements off the radio in exchange for in-kind removal of public
service announcements.224

221 Id.; see also Luka, supra note 70, at 318 (“The First Amendment interests threatened by the regulation
of tobacco advertising are considerably more substantial than many have recognized.”).
222 See Complaint, supra note 35, at 31; see also 1996 Final Rule, supra note 7, at 44,491–92 (recognizing
the need to implement some alternative programs in addition to the tobacco advertising and access
restrictions). This is not to say that regulatory authorities have paid no heed to the efficacy of additional
restrictions. These controls, however, are generally only being considered in addition to the advertising
restrictions considered in this Comment. For example, the FDA and the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services have issued draft guidance for proposed regulations instituting civil money penalties and
“No-Tobacco-Sale Orders” against retailers who fail to comply with the FSPTCA. See CTR. FOR TOBACCO
PRODUCTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR FDA AND TOBACCO RETAILERS:
CIVIL PENALTIES AND NO-TOBACCO-SALE ORDERS FOR TOBACCO RETAILERS 5–11 (2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM224464.p
df.
223 For example, a study promoted by the National Cancer Institute argues that smoking cessation
advertising restrictions should be less rigorous in light of the success of direct-to-consumer advertising and
smoking cessation products’ ability to help smokers quit. Rosemary Avery et al., Regulating Advertisements:
The Case of Smoking Cessation Products, 31 J. REG. ECON. 185, 203–04 (2007). The FDA cited other
countries’ restrictions on tobacco advertising and the positive youth impact they have had. See 1996 Final
Rule, supra note 7, at 44,491–92. Yet those countries included the alternatives discussed above in conjunction
with the advertising restrictions to achieve such progress. Id.; see also Sullivan, supra note 184, at 774–75.
224 See Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 588–89 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting)
(arguing that tobacco companies agreed to be taken off the airwaves in exchange for removal of public service
announcements, which led to later increases in tobacco consumption), aff’d sub nom. Capital Broad. Co. v.
Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), and aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. Kieindienst, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972).
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In Commonwealth Brands, the district court generally disagreed that less
restrictive alternatives are worthwhile.225 After listing several things the
government has done that did not reduce underage consumption, the court
found the alternatives “notable for the extent to which they would impose
substantial new costs on state and local governments and private persons . . . to
counter the impact that [Plaintiffs’] billions of dollars of advertising has on
youth.”226 This argument simply ignores the Court’s requirement imposed in
Zauderer, that the government must expend the resources necessary to protect
the First Amendment.227 In addition to the evidence showing alternatives that
reduce underage use, the district court disregarded the most blatant statistic
indicating that these alternatives do work: smoking rates have continually
decreased over the past fifty years.228 The fact that teens continue to take up
smoking does not provide carte blanche for the government to impose
sweeping commercial speech restrictions. Ultimately, the First Amendment
gives consumers a right to be informed about the products they are consuming
and the public is better off for it.229 As long as tobacco is legally sold and
distributed in the United States, the public has a right to the information
applicable to the tobacco products they consume. Indeed, Congress must be
willing to give up some ground to the tobacco industry to maintain the
usefulness of an Act touted as a victorious finale to “[t]he decades-long effort
to protect our children from the harmful effects of smoking.”230
III. RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS EXTERNAL TO A MODERN COMMERCIAL
SPEECH ANALYSIS UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON
This Comment examines the FSPTCA through the lens of the First
Amendment’s commercial speech doctrine in order to take a prospective look
at the implications of the current dispute in Commonwealth Brands. This
analysis is only one of many possible angles amenable to closer inspection. In
response, this Part briefly looks at a few important issues looming over the
225

Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 536–38 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
Id. at 537 (alterations in original) (quoting Response of United States at 36 (No. 1:09:CV:00117))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
227 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985).
228 See McKay, supra note 2, and accompanying text.
229 See Rosemary J. Avery et al., Health Disparities and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Pharmaceutical Products, in BEYOND HEALTH INSURANCE: PUBLIC POLICY TO IMPROVE HEALTH 71
(Advances in Health Econ. & Health Servs. Research, Vol. 19, Lorens Helmchen et al. eds., 2008)
(“Consumers who are better-informed about smoking, diet, and physical activity make healthier choices
outside the health care sector.”).
230 See Obama Signs Sweeping Anti-Smoking Bill, supra note 29 (internal quotation mark omitted).
226
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future of tobacco regulation in an effort to acknowledge the possible
counterarguments to the perspective adopted by this Comment. Section A
steps outside the Act’s provisions and asks whether the FDA is even capable of
regulating the tobacco industry when considered in light of its already
extensive obligations. Section B serves as a reminder that commercial speech
analysis under Central Hudson is anything but settled and the legitimacy of the
FSPTCA rests squarely on the shoulders of the Supreme Court.
A. Can the FDA Regulate Big Tobacco?
The tobacco industry is faced with unprecedented regulation of its products
through the FSPTCA. For decades, the FDA shied away from regulating
tobacco products.231 Congress similarly took a backseat approach to tobacco
legislation, delegating minimal regulatory authority to a variety of agencies for
the better part of fifty years.232 This regulatory hesitance may have been for
good reason. It remains to be seen whether the FDA can actually handle the
overwhelming burden imposed by the tobacco industry. As described in many
of the proposed amendments in Part II, passing constitutional muster under the
fourth Central Hudson prong commands an enormous burden on the FDA and
its employees to screen advertisements and employ more subjective rules on a
case-by-case basis.233 If the FDA’s other areas of expertise are any indication,
the agency is already overwhelmed.234 Though Congress handed the FDA235 a
toothless provision, ill-equipped to protect the public health, the FDA’s
“tenacious drive to maximize its regulatory power has resulted in its advocacy
of an interpretation of the relevant law that . . . [is] unreasonable”236 and may
be untenable.
231

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16–19.
233 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985).
234 See Craig A. Conway, FDA Gains Regulatory Authority over Tobacco, HEALTH L. PERSP. (July 2009),
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2009/(CC) Tobacco.pdf (noting that the FDA may only inspect
8% of foreign drug manufacturers subject to inspection each year and has had to divert resources to address
major health issues related to tainted food products in the past few years, including peanut butter, cookie
dough, pistachios, and peppers).
235 While the modern nondelegation doctrine seems to support Congress’s delegation of tobacco
jurisdiction to the FDA, it is by no means uncontroversial. See McGowan, supra note 10 (arguing that the
Supreme Court should reformulate the nondelegation doctrine to take some power away from regulatory
agencies).
236 Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. FDA, 680 F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding the FDA lacks
jurisdiction to regulate e-cigarettes under the FDCA), aff’d sub nom. Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
232
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With the growing demands placed on the FDA, it is also important to
consider the source of its funding and whether regulators have enough support
to reasonably meet the FDA’s obligations.237 The Government Accountability
Office reported that “the demands on the agency have soared in recent years
for a variety of reasons,” and the “FDA’s resources ha[ve] not increased in
proportion to the growing demands placed on it, putting public health at
risk.”238 The FSPTCA does include a “User Fees” provision that allows the
FDA to collect quarterly fees from tobacco manufacturers.239 Where these fees
will go and whether they will help the FDA meet its public health obligations
is yet to be seen. But given the FSPTCA’s inconsistent provisions, Philip
Morris’s support of the Act, and the relatively ineffective regulation left in
place, it is hard not to view the user fees provision as the product of a deal
between tobacco lobbyists and congressional committees meagerly trying to
appease their constituencies while leaving the tobacco industry remarkably
unscathed. With the feasibility of FDA regulation clearly unsettled, the
proposals made in this Comment should be taken, assuming (1) the FDA is a
suitable administrative agency for tobacco regulation, and (2) the tobacco
industry is capable of being adequately regulated.
Whether the FDA can handle the enormous task of regulating the tobacco
industry is better left for a separate article. It is important nonetheless to
recognize that there is a cogent argument that the FDA may not be the agency
that should be regulating tobacco. That argument sharply diverges from the
proposals adopted in Part II that argue for amendments to the FSPTCA in order
to give the FDA a more sensible regulatory scheme. From either perspective,
it is relevant to point out the hurdles facing Congress, regulators, and public
health officials when contemplating tobacco regulation.
B. Stepping Outside the Modern Central Hudson Framework
The analysis adopted in this Comment arguably lacks consequence when
considered in light of the Court’s failure to adopt a consistent standard of
interpretation. Looming over the entire First Amendment issue is the level of
scrutiny the Court will apply. As described in Part II, the Court has wavered
dramatically over the past thirty years in its application of deference to the

237

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-271, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 16 (2009).
Id.
239 FSPTCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387s (Supp. III 2009) (allowing fees of $85 million in 2009 and up to $712
million for fiscal year 2019).
238
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legislature. From Central Hudson’s initial intermediate scrutiny, Posadas and
rational basis, Coors’s and 44 Liquormart’s attempts to abolish legislative
deference, and the recent Court compromise in Lorillard, the future of Central
Hudson is anything but certain.240 The Lorillard decision is a prime example
of the Court’s failure to settle on an application standard. Rife with debate and
marked by four concurrences and two dissents,241 the opinion lends weight to
the conclusion that the Court has yet to find its commercial speech equilibrium.
Should the Court revert to legislative deference or adopt a vice exception to
commercial speech protection, the analysis in Part II would be largely for
naught because the FSPTCA should stand unscathed, easily passing a rational
basis challenge. Conversely, if the Court breaks new ground and adopts a
strict scrutiny standard, Congress would have to meet even stricter
constitutional standards. This would require even more government resources
and amendments that further chip away at the already-compromised
advertising provisions.
Either of these scenarios, however, is unlikely. Though some Supreme
Court Justices and commentators appear willing to adopt a strict scrutiny
standard, this outcome is improbable given the makeup of the Court.242
Reverting to the standard espoused by Posadas seems even more dubious
considering no Justice has positively cited the opinion since it was refuted in

240

However controversial, if congressional and, indirectly, public opinion are any indicators of the
Court’s decision making, then the future of commercial speech may be in the hands of a reactive Court. See
generally Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 971, 984–96 (2009) (arguing that the Court responds to public opinion and congressional threats through
Court-curbing legislation). It is similarly instructive to note the parallel progression of the Court, presidential
administrations, and wavering judicial ideologies applied to the commercial speech doctrine since the Central
Hudson decision in 1980. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 293–322 (2009) (tracking
presidential nominations of Supreme Court Justices and their corresponding judicial philosophies and stances
on constitutional interpretation). It is imperative to note that the Court took its most liberal regulatory stance
in Posadas when the Court was filled with Burger-era Justices, a notably liberal Court. Id. at 283. The
Court’s regulatory turn in Coors and 44 Liquormart was instituted in the aftermath of Ronald Reagan’s FDRreminiscent, court-packing strategy. Id. at 313–14. After public backlash from the Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), the Court set forth “a shockingly progressive set of decisions from a supposedly conservative court,”
FRIEDMAN, supra, at 339 (quoting Dahlia Lithwick, The Ghost of the Warren Court Past, SLATE (June 26,
2003, 2:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2084657/entry/2084901) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at
337–43. Given Congress’s current posture and the Obama Administration’s marked interest in tobacco
regulation, adopting a more conservative approach to commercial speech jurisprudence seems unlikely.
241 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
242 See supra note 166. Though outside the scope of this Comment, Judge Posner and William Landes
offer an enlightening look at the historical trend in Supreme Court Justice ideology through statistical
regression and political science methodology. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial
Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 (2009).
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Coors almost fifteen years ago.243 Though some political scientists argue that
ad hoc decisional analyses like the one adopted in Central Hudson provide no
systematic guidance and promote subjective, ideological decision making,244
these commentators provide no workable alternative. The Central Hudson test
may be unavoidable for commercial speech cases where the Court must
necessarily balance two important interests—the First Amendment and the
public interest. Accurately predicting the ultimate outcome may be an
impossible endeavor, but the implications flowing from the FSPTCA are all
too clear—the future of tobacco regulation, public health, and the right to First
Amendment protection hang in the balance of this impending commercial
speech decision.
CONCLUSION
On its face, the FSPTCA is an unprecedented regulation seeking to rein in
the tobacco industry’s nefarious efforts at addicting a new generation of
smokers. Nevertheless, the First Amendment protects not only consumers and
public information, but also unpopular speech directed at influencing consumer
vices. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected paternalistic government
intervention aimed at circumventing consumer choice by continually
reinforcing Central Hudson’s core principles and challenging past deference to
the government.
Beyond optimistic headlines, the Act’s advertising and promotional
restrictions are overly broad and poorly aligned with the Act’s overall purpose
in preventing underage tobacco consumption and protecting the adult public’s
right to truthful information. By ignoring less restrictive alternatives and
implementing Congress’s contradictory deal making, the Act’s advertising
provisions are an unconstitutional affront to the commercial speech doctrine.
Given its unconstitutional speech provisions, the FSPTCA is stripped of its
ability to effectively control the public health consequences of tobacco by
leaving a gutted piece of legislation effective only at reining in possibly
healthier alternatives to traditional smoking products. Instead of restricting
traditional tobacco distribution, the Act bans cloves and flavored cigarettes, a
miniscule tobacco niche, while illogically exempting menthol-flavored
tobacco, a product that makes up more than a quarter of all tobacco sales.

243
244

See generally supra Part I.
See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 74.
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Amidst the myriad of inconsistencies buried in the FSPTCA, it is no wonder
that Philip Morris supported its passage.
The FSPTCA’s advertising provisions are the most important piece of this
legislation. Without these restrictions, the Act is incapable of effectively
regulating the enormous tobacco industry and effectuating the laudable goals it
prescribes. Congress must be willing to put forth the resources necessary to
amend the provisions as required by Central Hudson and provide the FDA
with the tools needed to actively control the tobacco industry. It is important
to note that Congress’s refusal to ban tobacco distribution is precisely what
leaves the door open for First Amendment protection. Though clearly making
the FDA’s job more difficult with cumbersome—yet constitutional—
advertising restrictions, the FDA can take the necessary steps to mitigate
tobacco’s overwhelming effect on public health.
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